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Big Tobacco:
An Impenetrable Industry Regulators
Can Only Hope to Contain
"'Old Joe, that hip cartoon camel.., is now as familiar to young chil-
dren as Mickey Mouse, and apparently ... entic[es] thousands of teens to
smoke that brand.' . . . Teenage smokers accounted for about $476 million
of Camel sales in 1992 as compared with $6 million in 1988 at the onset
of the Old Joe Camel advertisements. . . .' Given that it is illegal to sell
or furnish cigarettes to persons under the age of eighteen years and it is
unlawful for minors to purchase or receive cigarettes, the targeting of
minors in cigarette advertising offends public policy. "Cigarette advertis-
ing directed to minors contravenes the statutory policy of keeping children
from starting on the road to tobacco addiction .... [L]eaving aside the
subjective questions of morals and ethics, the targeting of minors is op-
pressive and unscrupulous, in that it exploits minors by luring them into
an unhealthy and potentially life-threatening addiction before they
achieved the maturity necessary to make an informed decision whether to
take up smoking despite its health risks."2
This note discusses current issues involving tobacco regulation. First,
the note briefly addresses the problems associated with tobacco use and
indicates that the roots of these dangers begin in childhood. Part II of the
note overviews the general history of tobacco regulation and provides a
framework for the Federal Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) basis
for jurisdiction over tobacco products. Next, part III outlines three major
justifications for the regulation of tobacco products. After noting a recent
court decision which provided the FDA statutory authority to regulate
tobacco, part IV discusses the settlement between the tobacco industry and
forty state attorneys general which circumvents the thrust of the ruling.
Finally, the note concludes that in light of the perils of tobacco use, the
settlement marks a retreat in the war against "Big Tobacco."
1. Mangini v. RJ. Reynolds, 875 P.2d 73, 75-76 (Cal. 1994). The dissemination of products
such as matchbooks, store exit signs, scrip, mugs, and soft drink can holders advertising Camel ciga-
rettes has been extremely effective in targeting adolescents. Id. at 75. Sources suggest that the percent-
age of teenage Camel smokers increased from 0.5 percent in 1988 to between 25 and 33 percent in
1992. See id. (suggesting aggressive advertising increased Camel's popularity 66-fold).
2. Mangini v. RJ. Reynolds, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232, 241 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The combined number of deaths attributable to AIDS, illegal drugs, car
accidents, alcohol, homicides, suicides, and fires, fails to overshadow the
total deaths caused by cigarette smoking alone.' With an annual death toll
of over 400,000 Americans, "cigarette smoking is the number-one prevent-
able cause of death and disease in the United States."'4 By causing 1200
deaths a day and 50 deaths each hour, tobacco serves as the plague of our
time.' Given these statistics, the tobacco industry provides a clear case for
social regulation.6
Although resulting disease and death do not strike until adulthood, the
smoking epidemic begins in childhood.' Eighty-two percent of all adults
smokers started smoking before their eighteenth birthday.' Children are
extremely vulnerable to provocative cigarette advertising because of their
inability to maturely assess the risks associated with tobacco consump-
3. Kathiann M. Kowalski, Taking Aim at Teen Smoking, CURRENT HEALTH 2, March 1, 1996, at
13. Moreover, the number of annual smoking related deaths is greater than six times the number of
Americans killed during the Vietnam War. See James W. Henges, Cigarettes: Defectively Designed or
Just Extremely Dangerous?, 18 OKL. CrrY U. L. REv. 559, 559 (1993) (placing number of annual
smoking related deaths into perspective).
4. Kowalski, supra note 3, at 13. Tobacco related illnesses include cancer, respiratory distress,
heart disease, and other health problems. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 801, 803, 804, 897) (proposed August 11, 1995) [hereinafter Proposed Regulations] (listing diseas-
es caused by smoking). Worldwide, smoking causes nearly three million deaths per year. See Ronald
M. Davis, Slowing the March of the Marlboro Man: Unless Current Smoking Patterns Change Ciga-
renes will Kill 10 Million People a Year by 2025, BRrr. MED. J., October 8, 1994, at 889. If current
trends continue, smoking will kill ten million a year by 2025. See id.; see also Michael C. Fiore et. al.,
A Missed Opportunity: Teaching Medical Students to Help their Patients Successfully Quit Smoking,
271 JAMA 624, 624 (1994) available in 1994 WL 12788754 (expounding smoking's dubious distinc-
tion as "chief preventable cause" of cancer).
5. See William L. Roper, Making Smoking Prevention a Reality, 266 JAMA 3188, 3188 (1991)
available in 1991 WL 48744589 (breaking down statistics).
6. See Peter S. Arno et al., Tobacco Industry Strategies to Oppose Federal Regulation, 275
JAMA 1258, 1258 (1996) available in 1996 WL 10487835. Three interrelated justifications call for
government regulation: risk to the public health or safety, risk assumed by consenting adults, and risk
assumed by children and adolescents. Id.; see also Proposed Regulations, supra note 4 at 41,314 (not-
ing primary objective of regulation to reduce death and disease caused by tobacco).
7. See David A. Kessler, The War on Tobacco: Teens are Lured into Lifelong Addiction, SAN
DIEGO UNION & TRm., August 20, 1995, at GI (noting nicotine addiction typically begins during
adolescence). The most recent Surgeon General's report noted that although smoking among adults is
declining, tobacco use among children is growing. See Dr. Elizabeth Whelan, Children and Tobacco
Don't Mix, COM. APPEAL, (Memphis), March 27, 1994, at B3. Every day, 3000 adolescents become
regular smokers. See Kessler, supra at G1; see also Kowalski, supra note 3, at 13 (noting 3000 teens
per day start smoking). One out of every three of these children will eventually die from a tobacco-
related disease. See Kowalski, supra note 3, at 13.
8. See Kowalski, supra note 3, at 13 (displaying young average age of beginner smokers). In
1994, studies showed that nearly 19 percent of eighth graders and 31 percent of twelfth graders had
become smokers. Id. Three million minors consume an estimated 947 million packs of cigarettes per
year, despite laws prohibiting such sales. Whelan, supra note 7, at B3. Consequently, these illegal
sales result in an approximate $221 million gain to the industry. Id.
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tion.9 Despite awareness of the dangers inherent in smoking, many young
children often make a casual decision to use tobacco, believing that the
risks do not apply to them." Essentially, the epidemic is a pediatric dis-
ease, and unless the system changes, 3000 children per day will continue
to become smokers."
On August 10, 1995, President Clinton recognized the gravity of the
tobacco epidemic and called for new regulations to reduce teen
smoking. The following day, the FDA proposed new regulations gov-
9. See Arno, supra note 6, at 1258 (justifying social regulation of tobacco industry due to impact
on vulnerable populations). Government has long held the constitutional authority to protect children
and adolescents through its parens patriae powers. Id. Although individuals can choose whether or not
to smoke, the argument for voluntary choice disappears when dealing with a minor incapable of exer-
cising the proper choices permitted by law. Id.; see also Whelan, supra note 7, at B3 (suggesting pro-
tection of children as first priority of nation's health policy). Safeguarding America's youth from to-
bacco addiction has proved a particularly important governmental priority, and every administration
since the 1960's has singled out cigarette smoking as the most preventable source of death and dis-
ease. see id.; supra note 4 and accompanying text (qualifying cigarette smoking as most preventable
cause of disease and death).
10. See Kessler, supra note 7, at GI (emphasizing children's vast underestimation of tobacco's
power). Children do not experience the consequences of smoking, therefore they perceive these ill-
nesses and diseases as nothing more than rumors. Id. Studies indicate that only a small percentage of
children believe that tobacco consumption poses any threat. Whelan, supra note 7, at B3; see also Don
Colburn, Rise in Teen Smoking Has Experts Vexed; Few Start Habit After Age 20, Leading FDA Chief
to Labeling it a 'Pediatric Disease', WASH. POST, September 10, 1996, at Z07 (indicating decreased
percentage of students realizing smoking poses serious health dangers). In a recent survey given to
eighth-graders, only one half of them thought smoking half a pack a day posed significant health risks.
Id. Accordingly, the survey demonstrates teenagers today know less about nicotine than children of
earlier generations. Id.
11. See Kessler, supra note 7, at GI (characterizing smoking as "pediatric disease" because of
origins in childhood). Studies demonstrate that if children do not start smoking by age 18 or 19, they
will most likely never smoke. Id.
12. See Statement by George Dessart, Chairman of the American Cancer Society, Release of Final
FDA Regulations on Tobacco, August 23, 1996, (recognizing Clinton's bold step toward restricting
sales and marketing of tobacco to minors); Sonya Ross, ASSOCIATED PRESS, White House Begins Final
Review of Rules to Curb Teen Smoking, August 13, 1996 (observing number of youngsters picking up
habit too early); Kowalski, supra note 3, at 13 (stasing Clinton directed FDA to establish rules to
prevent tobacco from reaching minors); see also CBS This Morning, Newscast: Dr. David Kessler,
FDA Commissioner, Discusses President Clinton's Plan to Draft Regulations to Prevent Teen-age
Smoking (CBS television broadcast, August 11, 1995) (noting Clinton's unprecedented move declaring
nicotine addictive drug); Bill Clinton and Donna Shalala, Remarks to Advocates of Stopping Tobacco
Use by Children and Adolescents (March 20, 1996) in FED. NEWS SERV. WASH. PACKAGE (ranking
Clinton's proposal among boldest public health proposals ever). The Coalition on Smoking or Health
called the regulations the "most important health initiative ever put forward by a president and his
administration affecting children." Sonya Ross, supra; see also Associated Press, COURIER-J., (Louis-
ville), August 8, 1996, at 03E (ranking FDA regulation plan among nation's greatest public health
achievements).
As President Clinton suggested, the initiative comes at a very good time considering the dangers
of tobacco consumption and the rising rate of teen smoking. See Dessart, supra (revealing 26 percent
increase in teen smoking since 1991); see also Amo, supra note 6, at 1258 (recognizing evidence that
suggests marked' increase in smoking among adolescents); Colburn, supra note 10, at Z07 (stating de-
cline in smoking rate "bottomed out" and "stalled" after mid-1980's). After nearly two decades signal-
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eming the sale and distribution of nicotine-containing cigarettes and sm-
okeless tobacco products to children and adolescents. 3 The regulations'
central focus on children and adolescents reflects that nicotine addiction
typically begins during early adolescence. 4 The proposed rule would re-
duce minors' easy access to tobacco products as well as decrease the
amount of seductive imagery that makes tobacco products so appealing to
children. 5 Moreover, the regulations further the FDA's primary objective
of reducing death and disease caused by tobacco products. 6
II. OVERVIEW OF TOBACCO REGULATION
Despite the overwhelming evidence indicating the perils of tobacco
consumption, Congress prefers to regulate rather than ban cigarettes. 7
ing decline, smoking among teenagers appears to be resurging. Colburn, supra note 10, at Z07. The
prevalence of smoking among high school seniors increased consecutively in each of the past three
years. Id. In addition, smoking among eighth and tenth graders has risen significantly from 1991 to
1994. Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, at 41,314-15. Over this period, smoking among eighth
graders increased from 14.3 percent to 18.6 percent, and smoking among tenth graders increased from
20.8 percent to 25.4 percent. Id. at 41,315. Given the potential dangers of the situation, the President
declared that "we need to act, and we must act now, before another generation of Americans is con-
demned to fight a difficult and grueling personal battle with an addiction that will cost millions of
them their lives." Kowalski, supra note 3; at 13.
13. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, at 41,314 (providing overall goal of addressing seri-
ous health concerns arising from tobacco consumption and addiction).
14. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing young age of smokers). More than three
fourths of smokers begin the habit before age 18. See id. (detailing use of tobacco by minors). Nico-
tine addiction significantly contributes to the continuation of tobacco use. See infra notes 52-59 (dis-
cussing nicotine addiction).
15. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, at 41,314. Millions of children and adolescents can
easily obtain cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. Id. at 41,315. Ease of access raises concern given
tobacco consumption by persons under the age of 18 is unlawful. See supra note 8 and accompanying
text (discussing illegality of tobacco consumption by minors). Along with easy access to tobacco,
advertising and promotional activities influence a minor's decision whether or not to use a tobacco
product. Proposed Rules at 41,315. For example, advertisements and promotions convey images of
adventure, recreation, romance, and eroticism. See Arno, supra note 6, at 1258 (describing luring ef-
fect of tobacco advertising). With a $6 billion-a-year advertising and promotional budget, the tobacco
industry can be highly influential by "telling people what's cool." See Colburn, supra note 10, at Z07
(discussing impact of advertising that targets children); see also Kowalski supra note 3, at 13 (high-
lighting advertisements' display of potential for experiencing good times); Lauran Neergaard: The
Associated Press: Tobacco Law Burns Joe Camel: Advertising Restrictions are at the Heart of Effort
to Cut in Half the Number of Teens who Smoke, ORANGE COUNTY REG. August 24, 1996, at A01
(suggesting advertisements portray themes of fun, glamour, and independence); Whelan supra note 7
at B3 (associating advertising with glamour and trendiness). The proposed rule would not restrict adult
access or use of tobacco products. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, at 41,314.
16. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, at 41,314 (revealing primary focus of proposed rule).
17. See Susan H. Carchman, Esq., Should the FDA Regulate Nicotine-Containing Cigarettes? Has
the Agency Established a Legal Basis and, if not, Should Congress Grant It?, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J.,
85, 90 (1996) (stating congressional desire to regulate rather than ban tobacco). In response to the
growth in public awareness of the dangers of smoking, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act ("FCLAA") in 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amend-
ed at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994)). The FCLAA regulates cigarette advertising and labeling with
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Over the years, Congress has passed legislation, however, smoking critics
have always questioned the regulations' substantiality. s In support of the
case for insubstantial regulation, anti-smoking proponents note that no
federal agency traditionally dealing with health and safety directly autho-
rizes cigarettes, and federal laws dealing with health and safety specifical-
ly exempt cigarettes from regulation. 9 Although the government of the
United States may have extreme power and influence, no uniform federal
anti-smoking regulation currently exists.20 "Consequently, the country is
laden with inconsistent state, local, and municipal regulations that often
prove ineffective."'"
The need for implementation of a comprehensive control system contin-
ues to grow as the current system becomes increasingly ineffective.22 In
respect to relationships between smoking and health. Id. at § 1331. Cigarette packages must also con-
tain warning notices which adequately inform potential consumers about any adverse effects of ciga-
rette smoking. Id.
18. See Carchman, supra note 17, at 91 (noting disagreement between industry and anti-smoking
proponents concerning level of current regulation). Smoking critics attribute the lack of regulation to
the power of the tobacco lobby. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, FDA Regulation of Tobacco Advertising and
Youth Smoking: Historical, Social, and Constitutional Perspectives, 277 JAMA 410, 411 (1997) (at-
tributing exclusion of significant tobacco legislation to tobacco lobbying). To centralize public rela-
tions and lobbying efforts, six major tobacco companies formed the Tobacco Institute. See Matthew
Baldini, The Cigarette Battle: Anti-Smoking Proponents Go for the Knockout, 26 SETON HALL L. REV.
348, 365 (1995) (discussing impact of tobacco lobbying). This coalition has afforded the tobacco in-
dustry significant leverage in attempts to control potential government restrictions. Id. In addition, a
unified Congress will most likely not support restrictive tobacco legislation due to the tobacco
industry's contributions to political campaigns. See id. at 365 (discussing influence of tobacco lobby-
ing).
19. See Carchman, supra note 17, at 92 (showing limited federal control and regulation over to-
bacco). In contrast, smoking proponents point to numerous regulations that cover tobacco cultivation
and harvesting, packaging, labeling, advertising, and distribution. Id. In addition, the industry "pays
stiff taxes, allocates funds for anti-smoking programs, and provides incentives for states to fund anti-
smoking programs." Id.
20. See Baldini, supra note 18, at 358 (noting lack of federal regulation despite governmental
influence and power). The current legislation is of "patchwork quality"; what may be permitted in one
municipality may be forbidden in another. See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Extinguishing Brushfires:
Legal Limits on the Smoking of Tobacco, 53 U. CiN. L. REV. 435, 446-47 (1984) (recognizing unifor-
mity among smoking laws will limit inconsistencies). Thus, a consistent, national policy would be far
more effective than ad hoc state regulation. See Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising,
77 IowA L. REV. 909, 922 (1992) (arguing uniform laws increase effectiveness).
21. See Baldini, supra note 18, at 358. Commentators noting the lack of consistency suggest that
lawmakers base the establishment of a uniform system on the premise that nonsmokers have a legal
right to enjoy the atmosphere everywhere the law forbids smoking. See id. n.55 (suggesting legislation
focus on rights of nonsmoker). By emphasizing the rights of nonsmokers, this type of legislation
would place the burden on smokers to determine where they may legally smoke. Id.
22. See id. at 358-59 (commenting on mere results of limited and indirect regulatory measures).
But see Donald W. Garner, Banning Tobacco Billboards: The Case for Municipal Action, 275 JAMA
1263, 1263 (1996) available in 1996 WL 10487836 (discussing legality and success of local ordinanc-
es restricting cigarette advertising on billboards). In one successful study, a town drafted tobacco legis-
lation along the lines of liquor control laws which required merchants to obtain sales licenses. See
generally Leonard A. Jason, Active Enforcement of Cigarette Control Laws in the Prevention of Ciga-
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recognition of this need, tobacco foes have urged Congress to pass legisla-
tion to rectify the problem.' Because the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metics Act (FDCA or the Act) does not expressly exempt cigarettes from
regulation, many anti-smoking advocates suggest that the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) is best equipped to regulate tobacco products.24
A. The FDA
The FDA regulates the nation's food and drug supply.' 5 The FDCA
gives the FDA jurisdiction to regulate food, drugs, cosmetics, and medical
devices.'s The FDCA's purpose, and in turn the responsibility of the
FDA, is to protect the public from the dangers of unsafe and ineffective
drugs.' Although tobacco consumption poses serious health risks, the
FDCA does not provide express regulatory authority over cigarettes.s
rette Sales to Minors, 266 JAMA 3159 (1991) (explaining effectiveness of local initiatives which
consistently fined merchants and cited minors for ordinance violations). The effectiveness of this study
suggests models other localities. See Carchman, supra note 17, at 137 (finding consistent compliance
checking and heightened community awareness keys to success).
23. See Reynolds, supra note 20, at 447 (proffering federal legislation as solution to lack of uni-
formity).
24. See James T. O'Reilly, A Consistent Ethic of Safety Regulation: The Case for Improving
Regulation of Tobacco Products, 3 ADNIIN. L.J. 215, 233 (1989) (calling FDA most equipped among
federal agencies to control nicotine products); see also Carchman, supra note 17, at 93 (showing
smoking critics' rationale for FDCA control over manufacturing, labeling, advertising, promotion, and
sales). Seventy-five national health, medical, consumer, and religious organizations sponsor a National
Petition Drive that supports tobacco regulation under the jurisdiction of the FDA. See id. n.63. But see
Carchman, supra note 17, at 114-15 (stating agencies may not base jurisdiction on absence of jurisdic-
tion in other agencies).
25. See Ann Mileur Boeckman, Comment, An Exercise in Administrative Creativity: The FDA's
Assertion of Jurisdiction over Tobacco, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 991, 991 (1996). Since the inception of
the Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906, the FDA has regulated the nation's food and drug supply. See
Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, repealed in part by Federal,
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, ch. 9, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938).
26. See Boeckman, supra note 25, 991-92 (defining relation between FDA and FDCA). The
FDCA provides the scope of the FDA's drug and device jurisdiction and directs the FDA to ensure the
reasonable safety and effectiveness of drugs and devices. Id. at 997. The Act primarily functions to the
economic interests of consumers. See United States v. Article ... Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734, 740
(2d Cir. 1980).
27. See United States v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969) (pro-
viding overriding purpose of FDCA to serve public with "efficacy" and "safety"); United States v.
Undetermined Quantities of Bottles... Pets Smellfree, 22 F.3d 235, 238 (10th Cir. 1994) (demanding
consistency between liberal construction of FDCA and overall goal of protecting public health); Premo
Pharmaceutical Lab., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 795, 802 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing FDCA's
purpose); United States v. An Article of Food ... Nuglomin Lot 7056, 482 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir.
1973) (recognizing Act's overriding purpose of protecting public health). The Act purposely protects
public health, and the FDA decides how to achieve that purpose. See United States v. Articles of
Drug... Promise Toothpaste for Sensitive Teeth, No. 83 C 6129, WL 5185, at *3 (N.D. 111. April 25,
1986).
28. See Carchman, supra note 17, at 93 (1996) (noting FDA's limited ability to assert jurisdiction
over cigarettes). In contrast, the FDCA does not exempt cigarettes from regulation, therefore, many
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Since the passage of the FDCA in 1938, the FDA has held that ciga-
rettes are beyond its jurisdiction unless manufacturers or vendors make
affirmative health claims.29 According to the FDCA, only if a vendor
claims or represents that a particular cigarette can cure, mitigate, treat, or
prevent disease can the FDA regulate that cigarette as a drug.30 The FDA
has the responsibility to protect the buying public from misleading infor-
mation because in the circumstances of modem life, consumers are highly
credulous and often beyond self-protection."
The FDCA defines drugs as either "articles intended for use in the diag-
nosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other
animals" or "articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or
any function of the body of man or other animals."32 The FDA defines a
device as an instrument or other similar article "intended for use in the
cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease" or "intended to affect
the structure or any function of the body."33 Thus, under the FDCA, the
FDA has jurisdiction over nicotine-containing cigarettes if vendors intend
that they treat a disease or affect the structure or function of the body.34
In determining whether a product falls under the statutory definition of
a drug or device, the FDA and courts often look to vendor intent.35 If a
smoking critics advocate FDA regulation. Id. The FDCA provides grounds for FDA jurisdiction over
drugs and delivery devices, but since its 1938 inception, the FDA has not exercised jurisdiction over
tobacco. See Michael Whatley, Note, The FDA v. Joe Camel: An Analysis of the FDA's Attempt to
Regulate Tobacco and Tobacco Products Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 22 J.
LEGIS. 121, 121 (1996) (noting FDA's previous position regarding tobacco regulation).
29. See Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding
cigarettes subject to FDCA if manufacturers make medical claims for their product).
30. See United States v. 46 Cartons ... Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336, 337 (D.N.J. 1953)
(stating manufacturer representations can determine product's use). In 46 Cartons, the claimant mar-
keted 46 cartons of cigarettes along with 51 leaflets entitled, "How Fairfax Cigarettes may help you."
Id. at 336. The accompanying leaflet suggested that the product could effectively prevent many illness-
es such as common cold, influenza, tuberculosis, and acute tonsillitis. Id. at 337.
31. See id. at 337 (discussing FDCA's function in light of manufacturer advertising and labeling).
Due to the competitive nature of the tobacco industry, manufacturers often focus on advertising and
labeling rather than altering prices or changing the product's quality. See id. Congress realized that
manufacturers "tread[ed] near the statutory boundary," and noted that public consumers must be ade-
quately informed regarding product purchases. See id. Therefore, the purposes of the FDCA is to pro-
tect vulnerable consumers who may be ignorant, unthinking, or credulous. See United States v. Arti-
cle... Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734, 740. Moreover, courts should not provide a loophole through
which those who take advantage of the weak and gullible can potentially escape the consequences of
their actions. See id. (noting purpose of the FDCA); United States v. 250 Jars ... "Cal's Tupelo Blos-
som U.S. Fancy Pure Honey," 344 F.2d 288, 289 (recognizing court's need to protect public welfare).
32. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(1)(B), 321(g)(1)(C) (1988).
33. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2),(3) (1988).
34. See infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text (discussing vendor intent).
35. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 333 (2d Cir. 1977) (explain-
ing relation between vendor intent and definition of drug); Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655
F.2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(acknowledging key role of vendor intent for determining whether
product fits drug definition); Peter Bynum, A Stare Decisis Barrier to Regulating Cigarettes as Drugs,
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vendor makes particular health claims about a product, such representa-
tions constitute direct evidence of vendor intent to "affect the body". 6 If
a vendor does not make claims regarding its product, the FDA must con-
sider other factors to determine vendor intent."' As such, the FDA often
infers vendor intent through labeling, promotional material, advertising,
and any other relevant source."
In determining whether to classify a product as a drug, the FDA may
12 J.L. & POL. 365, 367 (1996) (discussing vendor intent and defining products as drugs). To deter-
mine vendor intent, courts often look to advertisements, labels, and promotional material. See U.S. v.
Article ... Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734, 739 (2d Cit. 1969) (noting advertisements, promotional ma-
terial, and product labels determine vendor intent). Regardless of the actual physical effect of the prod-
uct, the product is a drug if its labeling and promotional claims show intended uses that bring it within
the definition of a drug. Id. Thus, a product is subject to regulation as a drug if vendors make certain
promotional claims about the product. Id.
36. See Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing
potential impact of health claims). The earliest reported case attempting to define cigarettes as drugs
was Federal Trade Commission v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, 108 F. Supp 573 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), which discussed false advertising and the drug status of cigarettes. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) alleged that a certain brand of cigarettes advertised as less irritating was a drug. Id. at 573.
The advertising in question pertained to the manufacturer's representation that smokers could use the
cigarettes without inducing any adversely effecting the nose or throat. Id.
In Liggett, the court used the FTC Act, not the FDCA, to determine whether the cigarettes were
a drug. See Carchman, supra note 17, at 94 (noting FTC and FDCA's identical drug definitions). Any
substance which has the potential to stimulate the senses can qualify, in some insignificant degree, as
affecting bodily functions. See FTC Act § 15 (c), Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 55(c) (1994)) (providing broad statutory definition of drug); see also Liggett, 108 F. Supp
at 576 (setting forth consequences of overbroad FTC drug definition). Consequently, any article used
in a manner anticipated by the manufacturer which comes into contact with any of the senses may
constitute an article intended to affect the functions of the human body. See Liggett, 108 F. Supp at
576. As the court concluded, the legislators did not intend an all-inclusive literal interpretation of the
clause. See id.
37. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text (discussing relevant factors to determine vendor
intent).
38. See Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (recognizing
well established principle whereby courts use all relevant sources to find manufacturer intent); Nation-
al Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334 (2d Cir. 1977) (outlining sources in which
to derive or infer vendor intent); United States v. Article ... Sudden Change., 409 F.2d 734, 739 (2d
Cir. 1969) (acknowledging well-settled rule permitting courts to determine intended use of product
through promotional claims); United States v. Kasz Enterprises, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 534, 539 (D.R.I.
1994) (deriving vendor intent through labeling, promotional material, advertising, or any other relevant
source); Hanson v. U.S., 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Minn. 1976) (offering well-established rule of find-
ing intended use of product through various sources); United States v 250 Jars, F. Supp. 208, 211
(E.D. Mich. 1963), afftd, 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965) (employing method of determining product's
intended use through all relevant sources). Beyond examining a product's labels, courts look to various
other information sources for guidance. See 250 Jars, F. Supp. 208 at 211 (stressing courts should ex-
amine all relevant sources); see also, United States v. Articles of Drug, 362 F.2d 923, 926 (3d Cir.
1966) (finding intended use through broadcasting channels); United States v. Millpax, Inc., 313 F.2d
152, 154 (7th Cir. 1963) (revealing intended use through disclaimer letter and magazine testimonials);
Nature Food Centers, Inc. v. United States, 310 F.2d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 1962) (permitting claims made in
lectures and class notes to show intent); United States v. Hohensee, 243 F.2d 367, 370 (3rd. Cir. 1957)
(proving intent through promotional claims in graphic material and in oral representations).
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look beyond the manufacturer's subjective intent and find actual therapeu-
tic intent on the basis of objective evidence.39 Moreover, courts have de-
termined that an analysis based solely on subjective intent could seriously
diminish the effectiveness of regulatory agencies because it would allow a
manufacturer to introduce dangerous articles into commerce on the unrea-
sonable but good faith belief that the articles were indeed safe.' Al-
though the subjective intent of the manufacturer, seller, or distributor is
often controlling, regulatory agencies may use the objective standard.4
Through implementation of the objective intent standard, a standard
which focuses on the reasonable expectations of the consumer, courts
balance a manufacturer's interest in avoiding liability for unintended uses
of the product with the need of protecting the public.42 In determining
objective intent using the reasonable expectations test, courts must look
beyond a product's label and the manufacturer's representations.43 Courts
have considered other relevant evidence to include general public knowl-
edge of the usefulness of similar products, advertising materials, the effec-
tiveness of the product, and all other pertinent circumstances."
39. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334 (2d Cir.
1977)(expanding definition of drug to include objective evidence); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v.
FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 789 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating factfinder should freely "pierce" manufacturer's sub-
jective intent to find objective intent). In National Foods, the court acknowledged that vendor intent is
the crucial element in the definition of a drug. See id. In addition to actual vendor intent, the facfinder
should examine the objective intent behind the product See id.; United States v. Kasz Enterprises, 855
F. Supp. 534, 539 (D.R.I. 1994)(finding vendor intent based on objective intent in promoting, distrib-
uting, and selling product). If consumers use a product for a purpose in which the vendor did not
advertise or label, and the vendor is aware of this use, courts may find objective intent. See Kasz En-
terprises, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 539-40 (D.R.I. 1994) (finding intended use through testimonials regarding
product's ability to affect structure or function of body).
40. See N. Jonas & Co. v. EPA, 666 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cit. 1981) (stating subjective standard
would emasculate Act); United States v. Articles of Banned Hazardous Substances ... Baby Rattles,
614 F. Supp. 226, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (illustrating dangers of subjective intent interpretation). In
Baby Rattles, the United States brought an action under the Federal Hazardous Substance Act (FHSA)
seeking destruction of seized rattles. Id. at 228. The court noted that the results of a subjective intent
analysis would be inconsistent with Congress' intent. See id. at 232.
41. See N. Jonas & Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 666 F.2d 829, 832-33
(3d Cir. 1981) (noting manufacturer claims or recommendations control); National Nutritional Foods
Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 333 (2d Cit. 1977) (declaring vendor intent key element to statutory
definition); Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137, 1140 (10th Cit. 1976) (recognizing importance
of intended use in determining drug status of product); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Food and
Drug Admin., 504 F.2d 761, 789 (2d Cit. 1974) (declaring vendor intent crucial element in definition
of drug).
42. See N. Jonas & Co. v. EPA, 666 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cit. 1981)(stating balancing test produced
by implementation of objective standard).
43. See id. (noting broader scope of objective intent interpretation).
44. See id. (outlining additional relevant criteria); Mathews, 557 F.2d at 334 (noting sources for
deriving intended use of product); United States v. Article ... Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734, 739 (2d
Cit. 1969) (listing relevant elements for determining objective intent); Hanson, 417 F. Supp. at 35
(identifying factors for determining intended use of product); see also United States v. 250 Jars, etc.,
of U.S. Fancy Pure Honey, 218 F. Supp. 208, 211 (E.D. Mich. 1963) (including descriptive leaflet as
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In addition, courts determine objective intent largely based on foresee-
ability.45 Accordingly, a court may find intent to "affect the structure or
function of the body" if it foresees that a large proportion of consumers
would use the product to achieve such effects.' Under this theory, the
FDA asserts that a broad reading of intent is proper.47 Furthermore,
courts have traditionally given broad interpretations to public welfare stat-
utes, in particular, the FDCA.4
The FDA and the courts traditionally interpret the FDCA as providing
jurisdiction over cigarettes if manufacturers' advertising stated or implied
therapeutic claims.49 Since its assertion of jurisdiction over cigarettes in
July of 1995, the FDA interprets manufacturer intent based on indirect
evidence.50 This unprecedented conclusion, which established that nico-
tine in cigarettes is a drug, places tobacco under the jurisdiction of the
FDCA.s'
relevant source for determining intended use), affd, 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965).
45. See United States v. Focht, 882 F.2d 55, 59-60 (3d Cir. 1989) (using foreseeability to estab-
lish vendor intent). But see Boeckman, supra note 25, at 1027 (noting that FDA regulations describing
objective intent fail to mention foreseeable use). In using the foreseeable standard, the FDA severely
departs from FDCA precedent. Id. In addition, the FDA looked to cases interpreting the FHSA and the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (Insecticide Act). See generally United States v.
Focht, 882 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1989) (construing FHSA); Jonas, 666 F.2d at 829 (construing Federal
Insecticide Act); United States v. Articles of Banned Hazardous Substances Consisting of... Baby
Rattles, 614 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (construing FHSA); see also Boeckman, supra note 25, at
1027 (suggesting that courts examining vendor intent under FHSA and Insecticide Act lacked legisla-
tive history and precedent). The standard of objective intent under the FDCA has a deep legislative
history; therefore, the FDA's resort to cases interpreting other federal statutes is improper. Id. at 1028.
46. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, at 41,479 (discussing foreseeability and its relation to
vendor intent). The foreseeability approach prescribed by the FDA moves a tort standard into the lan-
guage of the FDCA, but the court has yet to determine whether the FDCA permits such a reading. See
Gregory S. Chernack, Developments in Policy: The FDA's Tobacco Regulations, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 399, 412 (1996) (examining implications of using foreseeability to determine objective intent).
47. See infra note 48 and accompanying text (providing rationale for broad interpretation of in-
tent).
48. See Chemack, supra note 46, at 412 (noting courts provide strong and broad interpretations of
public welfare statutes). In United States v. Park, the Supreme Court imposed strict liability in a crimi-
nal prosecution under the FDCA. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670-72 (1975) (outlining Su-
preme Court treatment of statute involving public safety). In effect, courts may waive the requisite
mens rea for criminal liability when a criminal statute serves the public welfare. See Chernack supra
46, at 412 (suggesting manufacturer need not know of dangers to be liable). Permitting strict liability
in criminal situations provides support for a tort-style intent standard for cigarettes. Id. at 413.
49. See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text (discussing basis for FDA jurisdiction over
cigarettes). Congress realizes that the FDA cannot assert jurisdiction over cigarettes unless manufactur-
ers make specific health claims. See Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 241 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (noting traditional view of Congress).
50. See Carchman, supra note 17, at 114 (implying unsupported basis for FDA assertion of juris-
diction over cigarettes). As a result, the FDA departed from its long-standing interpretation of the
FDCA when it asserted jurisdiction over cigarettes. Id.
51. See Carchman, supra note 17, at 111-12 (providing FDA's finding that relegates nicotine to
drug status). Nicotine, often described as a psychoactive drug, significantly contributes to tobacco
addiction. See generally Michael C. Fiore, Tobacco Dependence and the Nicotine Patch: Clinical
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B. Nicotine Conclusions
In reaching its conclusion, the FDA relied on general public awareness
of the addictive, psychoactive, and pharmacological effects of nicotine."2
Since 1980, many organizations, such as the World Health Organization,
the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association,
the American Society of Addiction Medicine, the Royal Society of Cana-
da, and the Medical Research Council in the United Kingdom, have recog-
nized and reported on the addictive features of nicotine. 3 In addition, a
1991 FDA survey indicated that the vast majority of the tobacco industry's
scientists understood the addictive features of nicotine."
Scientists determine whether a substance creates addiction by evaluating
the compulsive or regular use of the product, the inability to stop using
the product despite a desire to quit, and the existence of withdrawal symp-
toms."s The use of these factors has produced ample evidence to support
the FDA's conclusion that cigarettes are addictive.' For instance, 87 per-
Guidelines for Effective Use, 268 JAMA 2687 (1992) available in 1992 WL 11638339 (noting
nicotine's significant relation to tobacco dependence). Withdrawal from nicotine often causes craving,
anxiety, irritability, hunger, restlessness, decreased concentration, drowsiness, and sleep disturbance.
Id. at 2688.
52. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, at 41,484 (recognizing numerous reports regarding
nicotine addiction). Addictive substances, like nicotine, achieve their effects by producing psychoactive
(mood-altering) and chemical reactions in the brain that generate compulsive use of the substance. Id.
at 41,485. Industry executives have refuted the assertion that nicotine causes addiction and have sug-
gested that nicotine merely improves flavor and contributes to the smoking pleasure. See Lars Noah,
Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA's Effort to Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1,
12-13 (1996) (providing industry response to arguments suggesting nicotine causes addiction). The
FDA has countered these claims by offering evidence that suggests cigarette manufacturers deliberately
manipulate nicotine levels. Id. at 13-14. If true, this evidence would provide the FDA with the "pre-
viously elusive evidence" of drug use. Id. at 15. In an upcoming case aimed at recovering costs for
Medicaid patients, Minnesota Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey III intends to reveal as many of
the estimated 33 million documents that demonstrate past tobacco industry misconduct. See Richard A.
Melcher, Fanning the Flames for a Tougher Deal, Bus. WEEK, September 8, 1997 at 33 (acknowledg-
ing abundance of secret industry documents).
53. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, at 41,484 (listing organizations recognizing addictive-
ness of nicotine). In 1994, the FDA's Drug Abuse Advisory Committee characterized nicotine as a
drug and concluded that it causes addiction. Id.
54. See id. (noting 83.3 percent of principal tobacco industry investigators strongly agreed while
15.3 percent somewhat agreed that smoking produces addiction).
55. See id. at 41,485 (noting widely accepted definition of substance addiction). In addition, psy-
choactive and chemical effects on the brain are common components of addiction. See Michael S.
Burkhard, Cigarette Classification a Burning Issue: New Evidence Could Lead to Drug Classification
for Cigarettes, 6 Loy. CONSUMER L. REP. 116, 119 (1994) (providing common elements of addiction).
Within seven to ten seconds after inhaling, nicotine reaches the brain and produces effects similar to
adrenaline and acetycoline. See id. (revealing nicotine's effect on brain and nervous system). Conse-
quently, the heart beats faster, blood pressure rises, and the smoker experiences increased mental alert-
ness. Id.
56. See Proposed Regulations supra note 4, at 41,485-86 (showing widespread consumer addic-
tion to nicotine under contemporary definition of addiction). In addition, habit, pleasure-seeking, and
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cent of people who smoke cigarettes smoke them every day, and nearly
two-thirds of all smokers need their first cigarette within one-half hour of
awakening.57 In addition, although 70 percent of smokers report they
would like to quit, only three .percent achieve long-term success.58 Also,
in their efforts to quit, smokers experience numerous withdrawal symp-
toms including irritability and hunger.5 9
Numerous sources have disseminated this dismal information to the
public, which now recognizes the addictive and pharmacological properties
of nicotine.' Because of the vast documentation and compelling scientif-
ic evidence, manufacturers must foresee the potential effects of cigarettes
on the structure or function of the body." Although manufacturers claim
their products are for taste and smoking pleasure only, the objective intent
standard would hold that manufacturers foresee and intend the conse-
quences of consumers' use of their products.62
Given this data, the FDA concluded that:
"(1) the nicotine in cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products is a drug,
achieving its effect through chemical action within the body; (2) ciga-
rettes and smokeless tobacco are drug delivery systems whose purpose is
to deliver nicotine in a manner in which it can be most readily absorbed
by the consumer, and are, therefore, devices; and (3) cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products are combination products that the agency has
self-medication significantly contribute to addiction. See Fiore, supra note 51, at 2688 (discussing
other components of addiction).
57. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, at 41,486 (showing compulsive and regular use of
cigarettes).
58. See id. (reviewing statistics which show smokers' desire but inability to quit). Nicotine pro-
duces the "high" that smokers experience. See Henges, supra note 3, at 576 (noting feeling of eupho-
ria supplied by nicotine). This presence of nicotine in the brain along with its effects contributes to the
smoker's inability to quit. Id.
59. See Henges, supra note 3, at 576 (stating some effects of nicotine withdrawal); supra note 51
and accompanying text (listing withdrawal symptoms). Smokers will continue to smoke to combat the
adverse side effects of nicotine withdrawal. Henges, supra note 3, 575-76.
60. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, at 41,488 (noting existence of large body of evidence
which discusses nicotine's effects on mood). Even if studies indicate that nicotine is not a physically
addictive substance, it nonetheless affects the structure or function of the body by producing increased
alertness and relaxation. See Burkhard, supra note 55, at 120 (showing how nicotine affects body). If
cigarettes and nicotine did not provide enjoyable sensations, the smoker would discontinue purchasing
cigarettes. Id. Thus, by claiming that they do not intend nicotine to affect the function of the body,
that is "for nicotine to create a pleasurable physical sensation," the tobacco companies are basically
stating that they do not care if their products sell. See id.
61. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, at 41,482 (stating public awareness provides man-
ufacturers with knowledge of foreseeable use of their products). In 1988, the Surgeon General issued a
report that discussed the addictiveness of cigarettes and concluded that nicotine is a drug that causes
addiction and that the pharmacological and behavioral processes that cause tobacco addiction are simi-
lar to those that cause addiction to cocaine and heroin. Id. at 41,484.
62. See id. at 41,483 (asserting manufacturers foresee consequences of consumers' tobacco use);
see also supra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining foreseeability).
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the discretion to regulate using drug authorities, device authorities, or a
combination of both authorities. '
The FDA subsequently classified cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as
drug-delivery devices because they are essentially drug delivery sys-
tems." A drug delivery system, as defined by the FDA, is any instru-
ment, implement, machine, or device-like product whose primary purpose
is delivery of a drug; and that the distribution of the drug is accomplished
by a drug product.' Cigarettes and smokeless tobacco fall within this
definition because they contain a drug, nicotine, and deliver that drug to
certain parts of the body.' Accordingly, the FDA noted that cigarette
classification under the device definition would be consistent with the
traditional approach to device classification.'
C. The Regulations
On August 28, 1996, the FDA issued their controversial regulations in
attempt to reduce tobacco consumption among young people.' The regu-
lations prohibit, among other things: the sale of cigarettes to persons under
the age of eighteen years and require retailers to verify the age of the
purchaser; prohibit sale through vending machines or self-service displays,
unless the sales occur in adult-only locations; prohibit the distribution of
free samples or so called kiddy packs, which contain fewer than twenty
cigarettes; restrict advertisements to black-and-white-print and text-only
format, unless the advertisement is in an adult-only facility with vending
machines or self-service displays and is not visible from the outside or the
advertisement appears in an adult publication; prohibit outdoor advertise-
ments, such as billboards, posters, and placards, that are within 1000 feet
of schools and playgrounds; prohibit the sale of non-tobacco products,
such as T-shirts, hats, and posters; and restrict the sponsoring of sporting
events and teams to just the corporate name.69 The FDA's objective is to
reduce the percentage of minors using tobacco products by fifty percent."
63. See id. at 41,521-22 (defining cigarettes as drug delivery systems).
64. See id. at 41,521-23 (discussing rational for device classification of cigarettes).
65. See id. at 41,521 (defining device-like product).
66. See Proposed Regulations supra note 4, at 41,522 (explaining cigarette and smokeless tobacco
classification as drug delivery system). The FDA compared a cigarette to a metered-dose inhaler, "an
instrument that converts a drug into an aerosolized form for inhalation and delivery to the lungs for
absorption into the bloodstream." Id.
67. See id. at 41,525 (recognizing consistency with traditional FDA classifications).
68. See generally id. (detailing FDA's regulations).
69. See id. at 41,326-28 (outlining FDA's regulations); see also Gostin, supra note 18, at 400
(providing specifics of proposed regulations).
70. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, at 41,314 (discussing "Healthy People 2000" objec-
tive to cut adolescent smoking in half).
19971
SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
If the FDA does not achieve this goal within seven years, the agency will
consider additional restrictions."
As expected, the FDA's regulations faced stiff resistance, from the to-
bacco industry and its supporters.' Since 1905, the tobacco industry has
effectively avoided a variety of similar initiatives by implementing careful-
ly planned strategies.73 Despite the power of the industry and its past suc-
cess in challenging regulatory efforts, eighty six percent of the general
public and eighty four percent of the people in tobacco-producing states
support FDA regulation.74
m. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REGULATION
Early efforts to control tobacco focused on the need to educate smokers
about the health consequences of tobacco consumption.7" In 1965, Con-
gress enacted the FCLAA which reinforced the notion that smokers would
voluntarily assume the risks associated with smoking.76 Given new evi-
71. See id. (stating FDA will implement additional measures if regulations do not achieve objec-
tive).
72. See generally Coyne v. Beahm, Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin. 958 F. Supp. 1060
(M.D.N.C. 1997) (discussing industry challenge to FDA's assertion of jurisdiction to regulate tobacco);
see infra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing industry challenges to previous regulatory ef-
forts).
73. See Arno, supra note 6, at 1259 (noting historical success of tobacco industry when challeng-
ing potential regulations). In 1965, for example, the industry turned a new warning label law into their
own defense, which for the past thirty years has protected manufacturers from liability. See Alix M.
Freedman, Burning Questions: Tobacco Pact's Limits, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1997, at Al (mentioning
examples where industry manipulates regulations to their advantage); Myron Levin, Tobacco Foes
Scour Pact for Smoke and Mirrors Settlement: Activists fear accord may yet give industry a way to
sidestep significant FDA regulation of nicotine, LA TIMES, June 22, 1997, at AI (showing manufactur-
er ability to outflank new regulations). In 1971, manufacturers voluntarily removed their advertise-
ments from television and radio; however, this also proved advantageous to the industry because of the
inability of upstart companies to obtain a significant market share. See Freedman supra at Al (pro-
viding example how tobacco industry worked around regulation). The tobacco lobby contributes signif-
icantly to the industry's success. See Gostin, supra note 18, at 411 (providing reason why Congress
typically excludes cigarettes from major food and drug regulation). Studies indicate that the most
significant factor associated with opposition to tobacco control measures in the Congress was the
amount of money received from the tobacco industry in the form of campaign contributions. See Arno,
supra note 6, at 1261-62 (noting substantial majority of Congress receives money from tobacco indus-
try). Indeed, the industry has implemented numerous strategies to combat tobacco regulation including
the following: litigation challenging the FDA's jurisdiction, threats of litigation against the media;
lobbying and political contributions to gain influence in Congress; advertising campaigns with anti-
government themes; and the manipulation of the public comment component of the regulatory process.
Id.
74. See Jim Roach, Patton is off Base on Tobacco, CouRiER-J. (Louisville), Sep. 27, 1996, at 15A
(revealing public support of FDA regulation). In addition, 78 percent of smokers support the FDA.
Sean Cahill, Letters to the Editor: Big Tobacco Calls in its Chips, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1997, at A19.
75. See Gostin, supra note 18, at 411 (providing early strategies for regulation). Consumers
should have access to all information regarding tobacco so they can indeed make informed choices
about tobacco use. See id. (suggesting consumers buy without full knowledge of product).
76. See sul6ra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing history of FCLAA).
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dence that smoking may not be a voluntary health risk, arguments for
stricter regulation have risen sharply.' In addition, the following three
issues provide a compelling argument for the regulation of tobacco: the
health risk to smokers and nonsmokers; the increase in youth smoking;
and manufacturer knowledge and intent.7" Our evolving understanding of
cigarettes will profoundly affect the environment in which the industry
will challenge the FDA.79
A. Risk to the Public Health
Many individuals do not voluntarily subject themselves to the harmful
attributes of tobacco products; therefore, the law should provide the neces-
sary protections.' The need for protection arises where a nonsmoker
involuntarily breathes tobacco smoke emitted by a smoker." This smoke,
commonly referred to as secondhand smoke or environmental tobacco
smoke ("ETS"), contains many of the same carcinogenic and toxic agents
as the mainstream smoke inhaled by smokers.82
ETS poses major concerns for nonsmokers.83 In December of 1992, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") concluded that ETS is a carcin-
ogen that causes a plethora of diseases in nonsmokers, such as lung cancer
and pneumonia, and is also responsible for over 3000 deaths per year. 4
77. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (discussing addiction and its elimination of
voluntary choices).
78. See Gostin, supra note 18, at 411 (raising justifications for tobacco regulation); supra note 6
and accompanying text (mentioning three justifications for regulation); infra notes 80-134 and accom-
panying text (discussing justifications of tobacco regulation).
79. See Gostin, supra note 18, at 411 (noting change in tobacco understanding alters environment
for contesting regulations). See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing prior industry strat-
egies against regulatory efforts).
80. See Arno, supra note 6, at 1258 (noting compelling need to protect individuals from situations
in which they have no control).
81. See generally U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS
OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS 1-2 (1992) (EPA Report) (noting non-
smokers at risk because of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke).
82. See id. (recognizing growing concern of nonsmokers that ETS exposes nonsmokers to various
risks). ETS contains a combination of smoke given off by the burning end of a cigarette, pipe, or
cigar, and the smoke exhaled from the lungs of smokers. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, SECONDHAND SMOKE: WHAT CAN You Do ABOUT SECONDHAND SMOKE AS PARENTS,
DECISIONMAKERS, AND BUILDING OCCUPANTS, (1993). ETS contains over 4000 substances, more than
40 of which are known to be carcinogenic. Id.
83. EPA Report, supra note 81, at 1-1.
84. Id. The EPA classified ETS as a Group A carcinogen because evidence demonstrated a causal
link between ETS and lung cancer. Id. at 1-2, 1-3. The federal government has regulated common
Group A carcinogens, such as asbestos and benzene, but they have yet to provide similar regulations
for ETS. Susan Ross, Second-Hand Smoke: The Asbestos and Benzene of the Nineties, 25 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 713, 724 (1994). Although exposure to asbestos and benzene may yield similar results to exposure
to ETS, the federal government fails to regulate ETS. See id. at 717 nn.43-50, 721 nn.99-101 (explain-
ing health risks associated with exposure to benzene and asbestos).
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Because millions of people smoke, "ETS is a ubiquitous air pollutant"
which exposes every American to a substantial health risk." As the Supe-
rior Court of New Jersey stated:
The evidence is clear and overwhelming. Cigarette smoke contaminates
and pollutes the air, creating a health hazard not merely to the smoker,
but to all those around her who must rely upon the same air supply. The
right of an individual to risk his or her own health does not include the
right to jeopardize the health of those who must remain around him
86
When hazards threaten the public health, the government has the undis-
puted prerogative to maintain the public's safety pursuant to its police
powers. 7 For over a century, courts have struggled to articulate a precise
definition of police power.88 Nevertheless, courts generally conclude that
85. See Ross, supra note 84, at 713-15 (presenting dangers of secondhand smoke). The smoke
emitted from a cigarette contains at least thirty different pollutants, each presenting a potential health
hazard. See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Extinguishing Brushfires: Legal Limits on the Smoking of To-
bacco, 53 U. CiN. L. REv. 435, 437 (1984). From the average cigarette, sidestream smoke and main-
stream release approximately seventy milligrams of dry particulate matter and twenty-three milligrams
of carbon monoxide. Id. The dry matter can result in eye and nasal irritation as well as coughing,
wheezing, and sore throats. Id. Inhaling carbon monoxide creates additional concerns because it com-
bines with hemoglobin in the blood to form carboxyhemoglobin, which reduces the ability of the cir-
culatory system to deliver oxygen to the organs of the body. Id. at n.12. In addition to the exposure to
obvious health dangers, many nonsmokers argue that tobacco smoke interferes with their enjoyment of
life due to the unpleasant atmosphere it creates, particularly the odor. See id. at 438 (revealing addi-
tional interferences with rights of nonsmokers).
86. Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 368 A.2d 408, 415 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. X, § 10. The Tenth Amendment provides that "the powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." Id. Accordingly, the several States have the police powers to
protect the health and safety of its citizens. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. CL 2240, 2245 (1996)
(noting States' tr-aditional exercise of police powers to protect health and safety of public); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1904) (stating that police powers permits states to enact certain regu-
lations); Steven V. Kenney, Criminalizing HIV Transmission: Lessons from History and a Model for
the Future, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 245, 253 (1992) (discussing constitutional basis for
public health laws).
88. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (showing refusal of Court to define
limits of police power); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879) (recognizing Supreme Court's
unsuccessful attempts to define police power). While noting the difficulty in applying an abstract defi-
nition of police power, the Court stated that it was always easier to determine whether a particular
case comes within the scope of the power. See Stone, 101 U.S. at 818. Black's Law Dictionary defines
police power as:
[an authority conferred by the American constitutional system in the Tenth Amendment,
U.S. Constitution, upon the individual states, and, in turn, delegated to local governments,
through which they are enabled to establish a special department of police; adopt such laws
and regulations as tend to prevent the commission of fraud and crime, and secure generally
the comfort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of its citizens by preserving the public
order, preventing a conflict of rights in the common intercourse of the citizens, and insuring
to each an uninterrupted enjoyment of all the privileges conferred upon him or her by the
general laws.
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the police power extends to all matters affecting the public health or mor-
als.8 9
The arena of public health and safety is primarily a matter of local
concern; therefore, courts traditionally afford the states greater latitude in
exercising their police powers." The broad array of police powers autho-
rizes the government to legislate in order to protect the lives, limbs,
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons. 9' The State has ample discretion
in implementing authoritative bodies of law, so long as the rules and regu-
lations do not contravene the Constitution.'
Currently, state and local governments have enacted the majority of
regulations dealing with the tobacco problem pursuant to their police pow-
er.93 Courts have not hesitated to uphold such regulations and restric-
tions.94 When a non-profit group, Operation Badlaw, Inc. (hereinafter
"Badlaw"), claimed that certain regulations limiting smoking in public
places violated its right to equal protection, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio concluded that the regulations
were constitutional and a legitimate exercise of the state's police power.95
In rejecting Badlaw's equal protection claim, the court noted that smok-
ing does not rise to the level of a fundamental right, nor was the organiza-
tion a member of a suspect class.' Thus, the burden fell on Badlaw to
prove that the regulations did not have a rational basis.' Badlaw argued
that the existence of an exemption provision made the regulations irra-
89. See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911) (offering broad application of
police power); Stone, 101 U.S. at 818 (1879) (explaining scope of police powers).
90. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2245 (allowing States to legislate matters of local concern).
Public health and safety are primarily matters of the States. See id. at 2246 (noting primacy of States
in matters of health despite increasing involvement at federal level).
91. See id. at 2245 (recognizing expansive power of States to legislate matters of health and safe-
ty); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) (discussing traditional
interpretations of police power).
92. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (noting power of State subject to constitu-
tional limits).
93. See Reynolds, supra note 85, at 449 (attributing current regulation of smoking to States' po-
lice power). State and local governments are politically closest to the people, therefore they are most
responsive to public demands. Id. at 439.
94. See id. at 449 (noting success of local regulations concerning tobacco problem).
95. See Operation Badlaw, Inc. v. Licking County Gen. Health Dist. Bd. of Health, 866 F. Supp
1059 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (upholding constitutionality of smoking limitations). The defendants passed the
regulations based on the premise that "secondhand smoke is acutely harmful to nonsmokers with car-
diovascular or respiratory diseases, that smoking in enclosed areas is a public nuisance, and that non-
smokers are currently unable to protect themselves against these hazards." Id. at 1063. The plaintiff's
attacked the constitutionality of the rules and questioned whether the passage of the regulations consti-
tuted a legitimate exercise of the county's police power. Id.
96. See id. at 1064 (applying rational basis test to determine constitutionality of regulation).
97. See id. (stating rational basis analysis requires plaintiff to convince court of irrationality). The
court does not need to know the actual reason for enacting the statute and may even hypothesize as to
any possible legitimate state objectives. Id.
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tional because the exemption would protect nonsmokers in only select
environments, although the threat of harm to the nonsmoker remained the
same in all areas.98 The county responded by stating that the purpose of
the regulations was to provide protection to nonsmokers in traditionally
public areas and to minimize the effect on smokers in private places."
The court noted that the regulations may treat individuals differently; how-
ever, the regulations were not unconstitutional because they did not im-
pinge upon a fundamental right and had a rationally related and permis-
sible state objective.
B. Risk to Children
Although certain regulatory actions would fail as unjustified regarding
the adult population, the government, under its parens patrie powers, may
take action in order to protect the nation's children.' Such action be-
comes especially necessary in the advertising context because of the vul-
nerability of children."re Because of children's inability to accurately
interpret messages, advertisements directed toward a younger audience
cannot fulfill the legitimate purpose of providing meaningful information
about products in the marketplace. 3 Thus, society's interest in protect-
98. See id. (outlining basis of plaintiffs' argument). Smoking in enclosed public places, such as
healthcare facilities and governmentally-owned structures, was absolutely prohibited; however, certain
other public places, such as restaurants and hotels could apply for exemptions and could designate
areas for smoking. Id. at 1063. Bars, bowling alleys, and pool halls were entirely exempt from the
regulation, so long as they displayed a sign stating that a non-smoking area was not available. Id.
99. See id. at 1064 (providing defendant's argument). This would ensure that nonsmokers who did
not wish to come into contact with secondhand smoke knew in advance that smoke may be present.
Id.
100. See Badlaw, 866 F. Supp at 1064-65 (finding rational basis for enactment of regulations).
Although such regulations may limit the nonsmoker's exposure to ETS, they often prove inadequate
because of the nature of secondhand smoke. See Ross, supra note 84, at 726-27 (explaining potential
inadequacies of secondhand smoke regulation). Specifically, ETS has two phases: the particulate phase,
where the smoke particulate matter is visible, and the vapor phase, where the smoke is a gas. See EPA
Report, supra note 81, at 2-2 (describing ETS). Although the separation of smokers from nonsmokers
may limit a nonsmoker's exposure to the particulate phase, nonsmokers still are exposed to the vapor
phase of ETS, because in its vapor phase, ETS readily disperses throughout common airspace. See
Ross, supra note 84, at 726 (discussing potential ineffectiveness of regulations attempting to limit
exposure of secondhand smoke). Consequently, to protect nonsmokers in common areas such as at
work, at home, and in public places, more restrictive controls are necessary. Id.
101. See Marc L. Sherman, We Can Share the Women, We Can Share the Wine: The Regulation of
Alcohol Advertising on Television, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1127 (1985) (justifying regulation of
products affecting vulnerable population).
102. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing inability of minors to maturely interpret
advertising).
103. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (finding state's authority over
children's activities broader than authority over similar actions of adults); Gerald Thain, Suffer the
Hucksters to Come unto the Little Children? Possible Restrictions of Television Advertising to
Children Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 56 B.U. L. REV. 651, 683-84 (1976)
[Vol. XXXI: 125
BIG TOBACCO
ing and nurturing children outweighs any pecuniary loss which advertising
manufacturers may suffer as a result of prohibiting such advertise-
ments."0
Because the cigarette industry loses approximately 1.7 million smokers
each year (1.3 million quit, 400,000 die), tobacco manufactures must re-
cruit new smokers to realize a profit. 5 To replace the number of lost
smokers, the industry focuses its advertisements and promotional material
on the precarious minor population which constitutes approximately ninety
percent of all new smokers." The themes of these advertisements, such
as youthful vigor, sexual attraction, and independence, achieve particular
success because they deal with those issues which often preoccupy adoles-
cents."° The tobacco industry's behavior creates major concerns given
the health dangers of smoking and the fact that every state prohibits the
sale of cigarettes to persons under the age of eighteen."
(indicating advertisements' inability to achieve purpose when directed toward minors).
104. See Thain, supra note 103, at 684 (stating protection of minors outweighs potential losses to
advertisers). When manufacturers sold penny candy to children in "break and take packages," the
Supreme Court held that the merchandising induced children to purchase inferior quality candy and
took advantage of their inability to understand the gambling involved. See Federal Trade Comm'n v.
R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1933) (finding validity of order forbidding certain
trade practices because of children's inability to protect themselves). Although no fraud or deception
had occured, the practice induced children, "too young to be capable of exercising an intelligent judg-
ment of the transaction," to purchase a less desirable product of inferior quality. Id. at 309; see also
Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (noting well-being of
youths justifies regulation of otherwise protected expression); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
640-41 (1968) (recognizing State interest in safeguarding children from abuses which might prevent
growth and development); Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 (emphasizing protection of children in order to
foster growth into independent well-developed citizens).
105. See Charles J. Harder, Is it Curtains for Joe Camel? A Critical Analysis of the 1995 FDA
Proposed Rule to Restrict Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sales to Protect Children and Adoles-
cents, 16 Loy. L.A. ENrT. L.J. 399, 404 (1996) (noting necessity of advertising to replace lost number
of smokers).
106. See Joseph R. DiFranza, RJR Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel Cigarettes to Chil-
dren, 266 JAMA 3149, 3149 (1991) (stressing obvious need of industry to replace lost smokers with
children and adolescents). One study demonstrated the pervasiveness of tobacco brand names, logos,
and advertising messages when it found that 30 percent of three year old children and 91 percent of
six year old children associate the "Joe Camel" cartoon character with cigarettes. See generally Paul
M. Fischer, Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged Three to Six Years: Mickey Mouse and Old Joe
the Camel, 266 JAMA 3145 (1991) available in 1991 WL 4874578 (noting ubiquitous images and
messages conveyed to young people).
107. See Law, supra note 20, at 914 (providing rationale behind themes of cigarette adver-
tisements). Advertisements effectively influence a young audience because the majority of smokers
begin smoking before age 20, and approximately one half begin before age 14. Id. In fact, in just three
years of advertising, Camel's "Old Joe" cartoon increased the percentage of underage Camel smokers
from 0.5% to 32.8%. See DiFranza, supra note 106, at 3151 (demonstrating influence of advertising
on children). Since the implementation of the cartoon camel, Camel's sales to minors have increased
from approximately $6 million to $476 million per year. See id. (noting increase in sales to minors
represents approximately 25% of Camel's total sales).
108. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, at 41,315 (noting illegality of tobacco sales to mi-
nors); see also Harder, supra note 105, at 405 (providing unacceptable statistics and circumstances sur-
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Many state and local governments have enacted measures in an attempt
to limit assaultive advertising which negatively influences the credulous
public." For example, in Penn Advertising v. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore," the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land upheld an ordinance prohibiting cigarette advertising on billboards
located in certain designated zones within Baltimore City."' The court
determined that the ordinance furthered a substantial state interest by pre-
venting minors from purchasing and consuming cigarettes."' In addition,
the ordinance directly advanced state interest and was narrowly tailored to
serve its purposes." 3
rounding minors' consumption of tobacco)
109. See Garner, supra note 22, at 1263 (1996) (recognizing movement by governmental bodies to
reduce certain forms of tobacco advertising).
110. 862 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Md. 1994).
111. See generally Penn Adver. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 862 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Md.
1994) (finding substantial government interest in ordinance that promoted compliance with state laws).
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the four prong test for determining the constitutionality
of restrictions on commercial speech. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (establishing four prong test to determine commercial speech issues). In
applying Central Hudson, courts
must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commer-
cial speech to come within that provision, it must at least concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly a d -
vances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is nec-
essary to serve that interest.
See Central Hudson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
In addition to First Amendment issues, the court considered whether federal law preempted the
ordinance. See Penn Adver., 862 F. Supp. at 1414-20 (discussing issue of preemption). To determine
the extent of federal preemption of state regulation of cigarette advertising, courts look to the FCLAA
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.. See 79 Stat. 282 (1965)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994)); Cipollone v. Liggett, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); see
generally Edward 0. Correia, State and Local Regulation of Cigarette Advertising, 23 J. LEGIS. 1
(1997) (examining scope of FCLAA preemption according to Supreme Court guidelines). Using the
Cipollone standard, courts must determine "whether the legal duty that is a predicate to the common
law action constitutes 'a requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health ... imposed under
State law with respect to advertising or promotion ... "' Cipollone, 405 U.S. at 524.
112. See Penn Adver., 862 F. Supp. at 1406 (finding substantial government interest in decreasing
cigarette purchases of minors). Article 27, § 404 of the Maryland Code provides that "it is unlawful
for any person engaged in the manufacture or sale of cigarettes to sell, barter or give cigarettes to an
individual under the age of 18." MD. CODE ANN., 27 § 404 (1992). This section prohibits the sale of
cigarettes to minors, however, it does not expressly prohibit a minor from purchasing cigarettes. See
Penn Adver., 862 F. Supp. at 1406 (noting only sellers can violate section 404). The court, neverthe-
less, held that the ordinance wotlld reduce the exposure of minors to stimuli encouraging the purchase,
thereby decreasing the number of illegal transactions under sec. 404. See id. (finding ordinance ad-
vances public policy and provides substantial government interest).
113. See Penn Adver. 862 F. Supp. at 1414 (concluding ordinance directly advances City's substan-
tial interest). The court adhered to the judicially-recognized proposition that advertising increases con-
sumption. See id. (recognizing advertising leads to consumption). The court noted that because of the
impressionable nature of minors, billboard advertising would have a greater impact on the youthful
population than on the adult. See id. (noting susceptibility of youngsters to advertising). By restricting
[Vol. XXXI: 125
BIG TOBACCO
Similarly, in General Food Vending Inc. v. Town of Westfield,"4 the
court upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance banning cigarette vend-
ing machines."' In their challenge to the ordinance, the vendors argued
that the town's decision of a total ban was not rationally related to its goal
of preventing the sale of cigarettes to minors." 6 Specifically, the compa-
nies asserted that locking devices on the machines would be equally ef-
fective as a total ban and that the equal protection clause required the
town to choose a less restrictive means." 7 In rejecting this theory, the
court relied on the holding in C.LC. Corp. v. East Brunswick Tp."8
which held that the prohibition of vending machines does not involve a
suspect class or fundamental right and that the prohibition need only be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest to satisfy equal
protection and substantive due process concerns." 9
In applying this logic, the Westfield court concluded that the total ban
unequivocally passed the rational basis test.' 2' The court noted: "[A]ll
that the rational basis test requires is that the alternative chosen bear some
logical relationship to the end sought."' 2' The choice to totally ban the
vending machines was not irrational because of the existence of a less
harsh alternative of locking devices. 22 The availability of cigarettes to
minors provided a legitimate governmental concern, and the total ban of
advertising, the ordinance will reduce the demand among minors, which in turn will decrease the num-
ber of § 404 violations. See id. (stating decrease in minor consumption directly advances substantial
government interest). In addition, the court determined that the purpose of the ordinance was to further
effectuate s. 404 and was not based on smoking and health. See Penn Advert., 862 F. Supp. at 1417
(noting purpose of ordinance). Therefore, the FCLAA did not preempt the ordinance. See id.
114. 672 A.2d 760 (1995).
115. See generally General Food Vending Inc. v. Town of Westfield, 672 A.2d 760 (1995) (finding
ordinance furthers valid public goal of minimizing youth access to cigarettes).
116. See id. at 446, 672 A.2d at 762 (setting forth vending machine company's violation of equal
protection arguments). In addition, the vendors contended that the ordinance constituted a taking and
violated the contract clause because the ordinance essentially destroyed the value of their business in
Westfield. Id.
117. See id. (providing essence of plaintiffs' argument). The locking mechanism of the vending
machines requires human activation. Id. at 445, 672 A.2d at 762. The plaintiffs urge that human inter-
vention will just as effectively eliminate youth access to the machines as will a totral ban. See id. at
449, 672 A.2d at 763 (showing plaintiffs' misunderstanding of precedent).
118. 266 N.J. Super 1,628 A.2d 750 (App. Div. 1993).
119. See General Food Vending, Inc., 288 NJ. Super. at 448-49, 762 A.2d at 763 (relying on
previous case that set forth legitimacy of prohibition on vending machines); C.I.C. Corp. v. Township
of East Brunswick, 266 N.J. Super. 1, 14, 628 A.2d 753, 760 (1993).
120. See General Food Vending Inc., 288 N.J..Super. at 450, 762 A.2d at 764 (stating rational
basis test requires legitimate governmental objective).
121. Id. at 449-50, 762 A.2d at 764.
122. See id. at 449, 762 A.2d at 764 (finding rational basis for total ban despite existence of alter-
native). The court further explained that "[O]nce a governmental objective is determined to be legiti-
mate, the relative effectiveness of the alternative means considered to accomplish the goal is irrele-
vant." Id.
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vending machines served that objective."
C. Risk Assumed By Consenting Adults
Although adults may voluntarily engage in hazardous activities, the
government has a moral obligation to regulate such risks.'24 Given the
conclusive data linking dangers and diseases to tobacco products, the
justification to regulate tobacco is as strong as the justification to regulate
other voluntarily assumed risks." s Although smoking-related hazards
provide a strong incentive for comprehensive regulation, this possibility
nevertheless provokes controversy because "adults are thought to be capa-
ble of weighing any perceived benefits and risks of engaging in a danger-
ous activity."'26
Indeed, the primary issue concerning regulation of voluntarily assumed
risks often depends on whether consumers can in fact make voluntary
choices about product use.' The tobacco industry and its advocates
claim that consumers are aware of the addictive nature of nicotine and that
this knowledge affords consumers a voluntary choice to start smoking.
Conversely, tobacco critics argue that addiction and dependency limit
smoker autonomy. 29 The crux of this debate centers on whether the to-
bacco industry willfully manipulates the content of nicotine in cigarettes,
thus intensifying physiological and psychological dependence."
123. See C.I.C. Corp., 266 N.J. Super. at 15-16, 628 A.2d at 761 (recognizing total ban serves
legitimate objective). In C.IC Corp., the court noted that in making legal distinctions, there is often a
need for a fixed point or line. See id. at 15, 628 A.2d at 761 (noting need for points to determine
where change takes place). When no precise mathematical or logical way for drawing this line exists,
courts must accept the decision of the legislature unless the courts can determine that the line strays
very wide of a reasonable mark. Id. The town decided that a fixed point or line was necessary in pre-
venting minors' access to cigarettes through the use of vending machines. Id. Applying this logic, the
court concluded that anything short of a total ban would not achieve the desired results. Id.
124. See Amo, supra note 6, at 1258 (discussing government obligation to protect adults from
voluntarily assumed risks).
125. See id. (justifying regulation of voluntarily assumed risks).
126. See id. (noting controversy surrounding regulation of voluntary activities). But see supra note
18 and accompanying text (suggesting consumer inability to protect themselves from risks).
127. See Arno, supra note 6, at (questioning whether smokers can make reasoned and uncoerced
decisions about smoking).
128. See id. (offering industry views surrounding voluntary choice issues).
129. See id. (suggesting addiction impairs smokers' freedom to choose whether to smoke).
130. See id. (emphasizing critical debate surrounding nicotine manipulation and lack of voluntary
choice). According to a former Philip Morris scientist who worked seven years in the industry as Di-
rector of Applied Research, cigarette manufacturers deliberately manipulated the level of nicotine in
their products to overcome "the naturally-occurring variability of nicotine in tobacco plants." Declara-
tion of Former Philip Morris Employee William A. Farone, WALL ST. J., April 1, 1996, at 2, available
in 1996 WL 259477 (acknowledging industry awareness that cigarettes without substantial nicotine
would not sell). In addition, most industry scientists firmly believed that nicotine created an
individual's desire to smoke, and the smoker's acceptance of the cigarette correlated to the amount of
nicotine the product contained. See id. (supporting notion that manufacturers research and develop
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To clarify this dilemma, anti-smoking activists have urged lawmakers to
pass legislation forcing cigarette manufacturers to disclose the additives
and ingredients in their products.' In opposition, the tobacco industry
has asserted that disclosure laws would force them to reveal valuable trade
secrets.'32 Nevertheless, in February 1997, a federal judge ruled that a
Massachusetts statute requiring complete disclosure of cigarette ingredients
is lawful, thereby clearing the way for the state to implement the first law
of its kind nationwide.' In holding this law constitutional, the District
Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts declared that
the state's right to protect public health supersedes congressional intent to
protect the tobacco industry's commercial interest.34
IV. THE PROPOSED TOBACCO SETrLEMENT
A. Problems with the Settlement
In April of 1997, tobacco foes achieved victory when a North Carolina
federal court ruled that the FDA had a statutory right to regulate tobac-
co.135 In June, however, forty state attorneys general and the tobacco
industry reached a landmark agreement which some experts fear will se-
verely limit the effect of the FDA's declared right. 6 Although the set-
methods to manipulate nicotine levels). To better understand the workings of nicotine, the industry
conducted a significant amount of research to determine the drug's effect on various body parts and
functions, such as brain waves, brain receptors, and the cardiovascular system. See id. at 3-4 (provid-
ing comprehensive list of industry tests used to understand relationship between nicotine and smoker's
needs); see also supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing correlation between level of nicotine
in cigarettes to cigarette sales).
131. Cf United States Tobacco Co. v. Harshbarger, No. Civ.A.96-11619-GAO, 1997 WL 106950,
at 3 (D. Mass. March 11, 1997) (determining Massachusetts law requiring disclosure of cigarettes not
preempted by federal law); Frank Phillips, Cigarette Statue is Upheld: Judge Says State May Require
Firms to Disclose Additives, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 8, 1997, at Al (showing smoking critics' de-
sire for manufacturers to disclose cigarettes' additives). Smoking opponents further claim that the in-
dustry adds hazardous ingredients to cigarettes. See Phillips, supra, at Al. In addition, laboratory tests
indicate that the nicotine and tar levels appearing in cigarette advertisements do not accurately reflect
actual levels. See id. (stating actual levels of nicotine higher than what advertisements indicate).
132. See Phillips, supra note 131, at Al (providing industry's argument in opposition to disclosure
laws).
133. See United States Tobacco Co. v. Harshbarger, No. Civ.A.96-11619-GAO, 1997 WL 106950,
at 3 (D. Mass. Feb. 7, 1997) (finding ingredient disclosure law constitutional).
134. See id. at 2 (stating implications of disclosure law).
135. See generally Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 958 F. Supp. 1060
(M.D.N.C. 1997) (authorizing FDA to regulate tobacco). In Coyne, the court inquired whether Con-
gress had displayed clear intent to withhold from FDA jurisdiction the power to regulate tobacco prod-
ucts as customarily marketed. Id. at 1066. Finding that the legislative history of the FDCA did not
indicate Congressional intention to exempt tobacco from the Act, the court asserted that the FDCA ap-
plies to any product that meets one of the broad definitions of the Act, and the absence of specific
discussion on a highly visible product did not prohibit regulation of that product under the Act. See id.
at 1067 (summarizing court's conclusion).
136. See Levin, supra note 73, at Al (observing concern over tobacco agreement); see also C.
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tement would .place extensive restrictions on tobacco, critics note that the
agreement places a heavy legal burden on the FDA to justify their control
of nicotine.' In particular, the FDA may only reduce nicotine and other
harmful ingredients in cigarettes if it determines the following: that ciga-
rettes will be less harmful, nicotine reduction is technologically feasible,
and these altered cigarettes will not create a black market for cigarettes
that do not meet the safety standard. 3
8
Ordinarily, to justify a rule, the FDA must demonstrate that it has not
acted "arbitrarily or capriciously.' 39 Under the settlement, however, the
agency would face a considerably stiffer burden in that it would have to
prove that "substantial evidence" justify its actions." This new standard
makes it far easier for the industry to challenge the FDA in court. 4' For-
mer FDA commissioner Kessler called the FDA's newly won ability to
regulate nicotine "one of the most important public health victories of past
several decades" but warned that "it would be a major mistake to water
Everett Koop, Tobacco Deal Lets Industry off Too Easily, USA TODAY, June 25, 1997, at 13A (dis-
playing skepticism towards proposed settlement).
137. See Koop, supra note 136, at 13A (asserting primary criticism of tobacco settlement); Freed-
man, supra note 73, at Al (downplaying effect of court ruling giving FDA power to regulate tobacco).
If approved by Congress, the settlement would require the following: industry payments of $368.5
billion over the next 25 years, a ban on billboard ads and vending machines; near-elimination of color
ads; fines on the industry if youth smoking does not decrease by specific levels; FDA authority to
regulate nicotine as a drug, including required disclosure of cigarette ingredients and the option to ban
nicotine after 2009; and new warning labels that would take up 25 percent of the surface, with warn-
ings such as "Smoking Can Kill You." See John Schwartz and Saundra Torry, Tobacco Pact Calls for
Strict Federal Controls, WASH. PosT, June 21, 1997, at A01 (listing terms of settlement). In return,
the industry would receive the following: a dismissal of pending state lawsuits seeking recovery of
health care costs and class action suits; immunity from class-action and similar lawsuits; and a legal
damages maximum of $4 billion per year. See Levin, supra note 73, at Al (providing industry benefits
from settlement). If youth smoking does not reduce 42% within five years, the industry must pay a
penalty of two billion dollars. See Koop, supra note 136, at 13A (criticizing aspects of settlement).
According to some legal experts, the immunity provisions violate due process of law and the
right to a jury trial. See Susan B. Garland, What May Stub out the Settlement, Bus. WEEK, September
8, 1997 at 83 (discussing constitutional issues involving proposed settlement). In addition, former
Surgeon General Koop warns that the tobacco industry, by raising the price per pack by ten cents, can
easily cover the cost of certain penalties and make a considerable profit. See Koop, supra note 136, at
13A (explaining weakness of settlement term providing penalty for not reducing teen smoking); infra
notes 154-58 and accompanying text (using Koop's figures to reveal flaws regarding certain aspects of
settlement).
138. See Levin, supra note 73, at Al (discussing legal challenges presented by proposed settle-
ment).
139. See id. (observing new FDA standard for justifying regulation).
140. See Freedman, supra note 73, at Al (providing new FDA burden created by settlement).
141. See id. (stating new standard facilitates challenging FDA in court). Manufacturers may take
the FDA to court and dispute their factual evidence. Id. In addition, the court may defer to the FDA's
judgment only in those areas where the FDA has expertise. Id. FDA regulators openly admit their lack
of expertise concerning the demand for contraband. See id. (showing public knowledge that FDA lacks
expertise in shadowy field of contraband); see also supra note 138 and accompanying text (noting
potential FDA challenges upon approval of settlement).
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down or give away that authority."'42 Kessler and former Surgeon Gen-
eral C. Everett Koop, serving as co-chairmen of a panel of health experts
and advisers for the White House and Congress, will significantly effect
the settlement's prospects for approval.'43
B. Assessing the Settlement
Statistics show that the cigarette industry provides a clear case for regu-
lation.'" Given the continuous debate, however, no one measure has
yielded an acceptable solution.45 For some, the June 1997 settlement
marked the long-awaited meeting of the minds, for others, the agreement
permits the industry to follow the long tradition of cigarette manufacturers
outflanking their opponents.'" Although the settlement may appear as an
advance in the right direction, its stranglehold on the FDA would allow
the industry to avoid a significant amount of control. 47
The tobacco industry indeed has a long history of shrewdly turning
what appears to be crushing defeat to its advantage." Approval of the
settlement would continue this trend by requiring the FDA to show sub-
stantial evidence of their justification for regulation. 49 This provision
heightens the FDA's burden of proof, resulting in a decrease in the scope
of FDA's regulatory authority. 5° When reducing nicotine levels, for ex-
ample, the FDA must prove that it would not create significant demand
for contraband.'' FDA regulators freely concede they do not have any
142. See John M. Broder, Former FDA Commissioner Calls Tobacco Deal a Retreat, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRB. June 22, 1997 at A6 (displaying concern of former FDA commissioner).
143. See MEALY'S LMG. REP.: TOBACCO, Koop-Kessler Committee Releases Official Report on
Tobacco Settlement, July 17, 1997, at 4 (showing expertise and scrutiny involved in advising Clinton
and Congress). The committee recommends that the FDA have explicit authority to regulate nicotine,
including the right to phase out nicotine and remove ingredients that contribute to dependence. Id. The
committee also states that any federal or state regulation of tobacco products should contain non-pre-
emption provisions, thereby preserving all currently available causes of action in litigation, both civil
and criminal. Id.
144. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (discussing smoking prevalence and its relation to
death and disease).
145. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text (providing brief history of tobacco regulation).
Some commentators urge Congress to provide consistent measures of control at the federal level while
others suggest that a focus on local initiatives would yield the greatest results. See id. (providing brief
overview of regulation at local and federal level).
146. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (stating terms of recent settlement proposal);
see also supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting industry ability to avoid enacted regulation).
147. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (discussing industry benefits upon approval of
settlement).
148. See Freedman, supra note 73, at Al (discussing industry alertness to avoid regulation); supra
note 73 and accompanying text (providing examples of industry sidestepping enacted regulation).
149. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing heightened standard of proof).
150. See supra notes 140-41 (predicting new burden will limit FDA success).
151. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (noting situations where FDA will face problems
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idea how to prove this.' The industry can successfully challenge FDA
evidence because courts will only defer to FDA findings where the FDA
has expertise."3
In addition, the agreement inadequately imposes penalties on the indus-
try for failing to reduce youth smoking to certain levels in five years. 154
Cutting youth smoking remains a top priority, however, the inconsequenti-
ality of the punishment lessens the chance of industry compliance. 55 As
written, the settlement requires the industry to pay two billion dollars each
year. 56 This may appear to be a large sum, but in reality it works out to
be merely eight cents per pack sold annually, three cents being tax-deduct-
ible. The industry could raise the price ten cents per pack, thereby
covering the cost of the penalty while realizing a considerable profit.5
Although the industry may enjoy certain advantages if Congress accepts
the settlement, the elimination of numerous billboard ads and vending
machines may reduce the prevalence of smoking among teenagers and
curb the number of beginning smokers. 59 If, however, FDA regulators
cannot control nicotine as expected, the prospects for effectively decreas-
ing the number of current smokers will diminish."w Consequently, mil-
lions of smokers will remain addicted, and unfortunately, many smokers
and nonsmokers alike will continue to contract various diseases. 6' To
the dismay of these affected individuals, the settlement would block off
the most efficient avenues to recovery by granting the industry immunity
from class-action and similar lawsuits. 62 Information regarding the
with settlement terms).
152. See id. (acknowledging FDA lack of expertise in certain areas, thereby impacting amount of
regulatory control).
153. See id. (showing likely result of FDA rulings if they lack substantial expertise).
154. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (mentioning weaknesses of settlement).
155. See id. (suggesting penalty may not actually harm industry); infra notes 156-58 and accompa-
nying text (breaking down figures to reveal true ramifications of penalty).
156. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (outlining terms of settlement).
157. See Koop, supra note 136, at 13A (calculating figures to show minimal impact of penalty for
not reducing youth smoking).
158. See id. (noting industry willingness to pay small price if addicting new generation possible).
159. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text (discussing smoking patterns among teenagers).
160. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (noting heightened standard that settlement
would require); see also supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (highlighting industry manipula-
tion of nicotine).
161. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (listing smoking related illnesses); supra notes 52-67
(discussing nicotine and addiction).
162. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (providing term of settlement which affords indus-
try immunity from most future suits). By banning class-action and states' lawsuits, the agreement elim-
inates the economies of scale which make it easier for an individual to attack the industry. See Freed-
man, supra note 73, at Al (suggesting settlement affords industry immunity they sought all along).
The tobacco industry, while spending approximately 600 million a year on legal fees, poses major
difficulties to potential plaintiffs. See id. (noting difficulties involved in attempting to legally challenge
tobacco industry).
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industry's willful manipulation of nicotine persists to surface, thus allow-
ing manufacturers to escape future liability seems entirely premature.'63
In Coyne Beahm, Inc., v. United States Food & Drug Admin.,"6 the
District Court of the United States for the Middle District of North Caroli-
na concurred with the FDA's findings and declared that the FDA had the
statutory authority to regulate nicotine.6 This landmark decision pro-
vides tobacco opponents an unprecedented victory, however, the settlement
impairs this ruling, thereby limiting the potential to ultimately subdue the
industry. " Although the attorneys general boldly faced "Big Tobacco"
in their efforts to reach an amicable solution, they may have stripped
themselves of their greatest weapons. 67 The legal terms of the settle-
ment, as evidenced by a subsequent rise in manufacturers' stock prices,
take away a court-won right and mark "not an advance but a retreat. '
V. CONCLUSION
The widespread documentation detailing the perils of tobacco consump-
tion provides ample justification for regulation. Allowing current trends to
continue would simply expand the grievous statistics and permit the indus-
try to avoid responsibility for its unscrupulous practices. The Coyne deci-
sion gave anti-smoking proponents their long awaited answer to the future
of tobacco regulation by establishing that the FDA has the statutory au-
thority to regulate nicotine as a drug. The proposed settlement downplays
many of the court's findings and gives the industry yet another opportuni-
ty to sidestep regulatory control. The risks and dangers associated with
smoking are too severe to warrant a lenient compromise.
David M. Forman
163. See supra notes 52 and 130 and accompanying text (showing evidence which indicates that
industry may manipulate level of nicotine). By deliberately manipulating levels of nicotine, manufac-
turers intend to addict smokers. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (suggesting addiction takes
away smoker's ability to easily quit). Such behavior generates a considerable profit, therefore, the
industry will continue this unscrupulous practice until the law forces it to do otherwise. See Koop,
supra note 136, at 13A (asserting heart of tobacco industry lies in addiction). Although individuals
may discover information that exposes the industry's willful conduct, it "will be of scant use in the
courtroom" if the industry receives immunity. See Freedman, supra note 73, at Al (implying cigarette
additives and nicotine provide individuals with strong causes of action against industry).
164. 958 F. Supp. 1061 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
165. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing ruling of federal court regarding FDA
jurisdiction of nicotine).
166. See supra notes 17-24 (noting lack of previous federal control at federal level); supra notes
136-43 and accompanying text (explaining disadvantages of settlement).
167. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text (displaying settlement's terms which limit
previous ruling's ramifications).
168. See Broder, supra note 142, at A6 (presenting former FDA commissioner Kessler's opinion
about settlement).
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